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The literature on effective schools emphasizes the importance of a quality teaching force in improving
educational outcomes for students.  In this paper, we use value-added methods to examine the relationship
between a school’s effectiveness and the recruitment, assignment, development and retention of its
teachers.  We ask whether effective schools systematically recruit more effective teachers; whether
they assign teachers to students more effectively; whether they do a better job of helping their teachers
improve; whether they retain more effective teachers; or whether they do a combination of these processes.
Our results reveal four key findings. First, we find that more effective schools are able to attract and
hire more effective teachers from other schools when vacancies arise. Second, we find that more effective
schools assign novice teachers to students in a more equitable fashion. Third, we find that teachers
who work in schools that were more effective at raising achievement in a prior period improve more
rapidly in a subsequent period than do those in less effective schools. Finally, we find that more effective
schools are better able to retain higher-quality teachers, though they are not differentially able to remove
ineffective teachers. The results point to the importance of personnel, and perhaps, school personnel
practices, for improving student outcomes.
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The literature on effective schools emphasizes the importance of a quality teaching force 
in improving educational outcomes for students. The effect of teachers on student achievement is 
well established. Quality teachers are one of the most important school-related factors found to 
facilitate student learning (Nye, Konstantopoulos, and Hedges 2004; Rockoff 2004). Not all 
schools are able to attract and retain the same caliber of teachers (Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 
2002). Teacher preferences for student characteristics and school location explain some of the 
sorting (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2005; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2004; Scafidi, 
Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner 2008); however, school personnel practices are also likely to play an 
important role. Schools can control the quality of their teaching force through at least three 
mechanisms: recruiting quality teachers, strategically retaining quality teachers (and removing 
low-quality teachers) and developing the teachers already at their school. In addition, they can 
allocate teachers more or less effectively across classrooms.  In this paper, we examine the extent 
to which more effective schools are better able to recruit, assign, develop, and retain effective 
teachers and remove less effective teachers.  
To examine the relationship between school effectiveness and teachers’ careers, we use 
seven years of administrative data on all district staff and students in one of the largest public 
school districts in the United States, Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS).  From 
these data we generate measures of school and teacher value-added and use these two 
effectiveness measures to better understand the importance of personnel practices. Our results 
reveal four key findings. First, among teachers who switch schools, higher value-added teachers 
transfer to schools with higher school-level value-added. Second, we find that more effective 
schools provide more equitable class assignments to their novice teachers. Novice teachers in 4 
 
more effective schools receive students with similar average prior achievement to their 
colleagues, which is not the case in less effective schools.  Third, we find that more effective 
schools are better able to develop their teachers’ ability to raise student achievement.  Teachers’ 
value-added improves more between years when they work in schools that were more effective 
in a prior period. Fourth and finally, we find that more effective schools are better able to retain 
effective teachers. Teachers who are in the top quartile of teacher value-added are substantially 
less likely to leave when employed in more effective schools than when employed in less 




Although academic ability and family backgrounds of students are important 
determinants of achievement, schools with similar student profiles can vary widely in the 
learning gains of their students  (Sammons, Hillman, and Mortimore 1995; Willms and 
Raudenbush 1989).  Quality teachers are one of the most important school-related factors found 
to facilitate student learning, and likely explain at least some of the difference in effectiveness 
across schools (Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander 2007; Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger 2008; Nye, 
Konstantopoulos, and Hedges 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005; Rockoff 2004; Sanders 
and Rivers 1996). Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007) find that a one standard deviation 
improvement in math teacher quality, as measured by the test score gains of their students, raises 
students’ math scores by the equivalent of 0.13 grade equivalents per semester. Kane, Rockoff, 
and Staiger (2008) find that the difference in effectiveness between the top and bottom quartile 
of elementary school teachers leads to a 0.33 standard deviation difference in student test score 5 
 
gains in a school year. For middle school teachers the standard deviation difference is about 0.20 
standard deviations (Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger 2008).  
Teachers are clearly one of schools’ most important resources. Teachers are not, 
however, randomly assigned to schools or students. Schools vary considerably in the types of 
teachers they employ. Some of these differences are largely outside of a school’s control and due 
to teachers’ preferences for certain types of students or for schools located in certain geographic 
areas. Teacher preferences make it easier for some types of schools to attract candidates for open 
positions (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Ronfeldt, and Wyckoff 2011) and easier for some types of 
schools to retain their effective teachers because they are more appealing places to work.  
Though the quality of a school’s teaching force is partially driven by teachers’ 
preferences for certain types of schools, it is also likely to be at least partially the result of school 
policies and practices of school leaders. School leaders can control the quality of the teaching 
force at their school by hiring high-quality teachers; by strategically retaining good teachers and 
removing poor teachers; and by developing the teachers already at their school. Moreover, they 
can maximize the effectiveness of their available teachers by assigning them to classes for which 
they are best suited and through which provides the most benefit to their school.  Schools are 
likely to vary in their capacity to engage in each of these personnel practices. We know little 
about the extent to which these practices are defining features of effective schools.  
A first step in effective personnel practices is an ability to identify strengths and 
weaknesses of teachers and teacher candidates.  There is evidence that many school leaders can 
distinguish highly effective teachers both during the hiring process and from among the teachers 
currently employed at their school.  While, Rockoff, Jacob, Kane, and Staiger (2008) point out 
that information available on candidates at the time of hire may be limited making it difficult for 6 
 
school administrators to recognize a good teacher when they are looking to hire one, (Boyd, 
Lankford, Loeb, Ronfeldt, and Wyckoff, forthcoming) find that, on average, school leaders are 
able to recognize teacher effectiveness in the hiring process, especially when hiring teachers with 
prior teaching experience. There is even stronger evidence that school administrators can identify 
differences between the effectiveness of teachers currently working at their school. Jacob and 
Lefgren (2008) find that principals can identify the teachers at their school who are most and 
least effective at raising student achievement, though they have less ability to distinguish 
between teachers in the middle of the quality distribution. Jacob (2010) examines the weight that 
school administrators place on a variety of teacher characteristics when deciding which teachers 
to dismiss. He finds that principals consider teacher absences, value-added to student 
achievement and several demographic characteristics when making dismissal decisions.   
Of course, even if school administrators are able to identify their least-effective teachers, 
dismissing weak teachers is not always possible, particularly once teachers obtain tenure.  Very 
few teachers are dismissed from schools, though dismissal rates are higher for less experienced 
teachers and may have risen slightly recently.  Yet, dismissal is not the only, or even the primary, 
way that schools can facilitate the turnover of less effective teachers.  Counseling out, less-than-
prime class assignments and the manipulation of other working conditions can all encourage 
teachers to leave particular schools, either by prompting them to transfer to other schools or to 
leave teaching all together (Balu, Beteille, and Loeb 2010).  While these processes are 
acknowledged in the research literature, no study that we know of has documented systematic 
differences in the differential turnover of high and low quality teachers across schools, which is a 
key component of our analyses. 7 
 
Another way that schools can control the average quality of the teachers at their school is 
by providing professional development or other avenues to develop the instructional skills of 
their teaching staff. Prior research suggests that teachers can improve substantially as they 
acquire more experience, particularly in their first few years of teaching(Rockoff 2004).  
Developing the skills of the teachers at a school through professional development may be both 
the most viable and the most effective option for schools looking to improve the quality of their 
teaching force. Teacher development is likely to be an important part of teacher quality in all 
schools but may be particularly important in schools serving many low-achieving, poor, and 
minority students.  These schools often face more difficulty attracting and retaining effective 
teachers (Ferguson 1998; Krei 1998; Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2002).   
The process by which teachers are assigned to students is another component of 
personnel practices that may distinguish more effective schools from less effective schools.  
There is evidence from prior research that, within schools, teachers with certain characteristics 
are systematically sorted to lower-achieving and more disadvantaged students than their 
colleagues (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2006; Feng 2010; Rothstein 2009). This type of 
allocation of teachers to students does not always seem to be done with students’ best interests in 
mind (e.g., it is often based on seniority) and is likely to have negative implications for within-
school achievement gaps and for teacher retention (Feng 2010; Kalogrides, Loeb, and Béteille 
2011).  The processes by which teachers are allocated to students within schools may vary 
considerably across schools and, in particular, may happen more equitably in more effective 
schools. 
In this paper we examine whether there are differences in teacher hiring, assignment, 
development and retention in more effective schools compared to less effective schools.  We do 8 
 
not attempt to distinguish the part of recruitment and retention that is driven by school personnel 
practices from that driven by teacher preferences.  Instead we measure the extent to which highly 
effective schools attract, assign, develop and retain teachers differently than less effective 
schools.  If they tend to recruit more effective teachers, but not retain them, then we can 
conclude that in the current system recruitment is a more salient factor in determining school 
effectiveness.  If they retain their good teachers but do not develop them, we can, again conclude 
that retention is more of a driving force in effective schooling.  If they develop their teachers but 
do not differentially assign, we would conclude that unequal assignment of students to new 
teachers is not a reflection of less effective schooling.  In fact, we find that more effective 
schools are better able to hire high-quality teachers, that they allocate their teachers to students 
more equitably, that they better develop the teachers already at their school, and that they 
differentially retain high-quality teachers, though they do not differentially loose less effective 
teachers. In what follows, we first describe the data and methods, then present the results and 
conclude with a discussion of the implications of the analyses. 
 
DATA  
To examine the role of personnel practices in school effectiveness, we use data from 
administrative files on all staff and students in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-
DCPS) district from the 2003-04 through the 2009-10 school years. M-DCPS is the largest 
school district in Florida and the fourth largest in the country, trailing only New York City, Los 
Angeles Unified, and the City of Chicago School District. In 2008, M-DCPS enrolled almost 
352,000 students, more than 200,000 of whom were Hispanic.
  With more than 350 schools 9 
 
observed over a seven-year time frame, the data provide substantial variation for examining 
differences in school and teacher effectiveness.  
We use measures of teacher and school effectiveness based on the achievement gains in 
math and reading of students at a school or in a teacher’s classroom. The test score data include 
math and reading scores from the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT). The FCAT 
is given in math and reading to students in grades 3-10. It is also given in writing and science to 
a subset of grades, though we use only math and reading tests for this paper.  The FCAT includes 
criterion referenced tests measuring selected benchmarks from the Sunshine State Standards 
(SSS). We standardize students’ test scores to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one within each grade and school-year.  
We combine the test score data with demographic information including student race, 
gender, free/reduced price lunch eligibility, and whether students are limited English proficient. 
We also link students to their teachers via a database that lists the course title, classroom 
identifier, and teacher of every course in which a student was enrolled in each year (including 
elementary school students who simply have the same teacher and classroom listed for each 
subject). We use the classroom identifier to generate classroom measures such as the percent of 
minority students, the percent of students receiving free or reduced priced lunches, and average 
student achievement in the prior school year. We obtain M-DCPS staff information from a 
database that includes demographic measures, prior experience in the district, highest degree 
earned, current position, and current school for all district staff.  
  Table 1 lists the means and standard deviations of all variables used in our analyses. 
There are 351,888 unique tested students included in our estimation of value-added, each of 
whom is included for an average of three years. Nearly 90 percent of students in the district are 10 
 
black or Hispanic and more than 60 percent qualify for free or reduced-price lunches. We were 
able to compute value-added estimates for about 10,000 teachers who taught students who were 
tested in math and reading. These teachers average approximately eight years of experience in 
the district; they are predominantly female (79 percent); and their racial composition is similar to 




  The goal of value-added models is to statistically isolate the contribution of schools or 
teachers to student outcomes from all other factors that may influence outcomes (Meyer 1997; 
Rubin, Stuart, and Zanutto 2004). Isolating causal effects is important given that differences in 
student and family characteristics account for more of the variation in student outcomes than 
school-related factors (Coleman 1990; Downey, Hippel, and Broh 2004) and that students are not 
randomly assigned to teachers or schools (Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2002; Rothstein 2009).  
  A student’s achievement level in any given year is a cumulative function of current and 
prior school, family, and neighborhood experiences. While researchers seldom have access to 
complete information on all factors that would predict a student’s current achievement level 
(Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005), much of the confounding influence of unobserved student 
academic and family characteristics can be eliminated by focusing on gains in student 
achievement over specific time periods, usually of one school year. The inclusion of prior 
achievement as a way of controlling for prior student or family experiences reduces the potential 
for unobserved factors to introduce bias in the estimation of teacher or school effectiveness. Yet, 
there still may be unobservable differences between students that influence the amount they learn 11 
 
each year in addition to their score at the beginning of the year. Factors such as innate ability, 
motivation, familial support for education, or parental education could all have an impact on 
student learning gains. We can control for some of these differences by including student-level 
covariates in the model; however, the information available in administrative datasets such as 
ours is limited. One way of controlling for all observed and unobserved student characteristics 
that may be associated with achievement gains is to include a student fixed effect in the value-
added estimation. Such a specification is appealing because it allows for the examination of 
differences in learning within the same student in years they are in a class with a different 
teacher or in years they are in different schools.  
  Equation (1) describes our school value-added model which predicts the achievement 
gain between year t-1 and year t for student i with teacher j in school s as a function of time-
varying student characteristics        , classroom characteristics      , time-varying school 
characteristics, (     , student fixed effects      and a school by year fixed effect (     .  
                                                                           ( 1 )  
The parameter   reflects the contribution of a given school to growth in student achievement 
after controlling for all observed time-varying student characteristics, observed and unobserved 
time invariant student characteristics, and characteristics of students’ classrooms that may be 
associated with learning. It captures all of the school-level factors that influence growth in 
student achievement. Note that these models account for all unobserved time-invariant attributes 
of students that may be associated with learning (via the student fixed effect), but not for 
differences across schools in unobservable time-varying student characteristics that are 
associated with learning.  12 
 
  The model in Equation 1 is identified from students who attend multiple schools during 
the observation period. Students may attend multiple schools for a variety of reasons including 
residential relocation, expulsion, or transfers that result when students transition away from a 
school after completing the final offered grade. Since we have seven years of test data and 
students are tested in a wide range of grades (3-10), we observe over half of tested students (52 
percent) in two or more schools. However, given concerns that this group of students may not be 
representative of the full population of tested students, we compare the estimates derived from 
Equation 1 with those derived from a similar model that excludes the student fixed effect.  Our 
school fixed effects estimates from these two specifications correlate quite highly at .84 in math 
and .74 in reading.  In what follows, we present estimates from models that use the measure of 
school value-added that is estimated with the student fixed effect. However, in results not shown 
we also estimate all of our models using the measure of school value-added that is estimated 
without a student fixed-effect. The results are substantively similar. 
  We estimate teacher value-added using a similar model as described by Equation 1. We 
replace the school by year fixed effect with a teacher by year fixed effect. In the teacher value-
added equation the parameter   reflects the contribution of a given teacher to growth in student 
achievement each year, conditional on the characteristics described above. In addition to the 
specification of teacher value-added with a student fixed effect, we also generate measures of 
teacher value-added from models that include a school fixed effect (without a student fixed 
effect) and that include neither student nor school fixed effects. In the analysis presented below, 
we compare the results using all three measures of teacher value-added. 
The test scores used to generate the value-added estimates are the scaled scores from the 
FCAT, standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for each grade in 13 
 
each year. Subscripts for subjects are omitted for simplicity but we estimate Equation 1 
separately for student achievement gains in math and reading.  Since we use a lagged test score 
to construct our dependent variables, the youngest tested grade (grade 3) and the first year of 
data we have (2003) are omitted from the analyses though their information is used to compute a 
learning gain in grade 4 and in 2004. The time-varying student characteristics used in our 
analyses are whether the student qualifies for free or reduced priced lunch, whether they are 
currently classified as limited English proficient, whether they are repeating the grade in which 
they are currently enrolled, and the number of days they missed school in a given year due to 
absence or suspension. Student race and gender are absorbed by the student fixed effect but are 
included in models that exclude the student fixed effect. The class and school-level controls used 
in the models include average prior achievement, proportion black, Hispanic, female, receiving 
free or reduced priced lunches, and limited English proficient, and the average number of days 
that students in the school/class missed school in the prior year due to absence or suspension. 
The school-level controls used in the models include average prior achievement, and proportion 
black, Hispanic and receiving free or reduced priced lunches.  
After estimating Equation 1 we save the school by year and teacher by year fixed effects 
and their corresponding standard errors. The estimated coefficients for these fixed effects include 
measurement error as well as real differences in achievement gains associated with teachers or 
schools. We therefore shrink the estimates using the empirical Bayes method to bring imprecise 
estimates closer to the mean (see Appendix 1). There is greater imprecision in our estimates of 
teacher value-added than school value-added since teachers’ class sizes are smaller than the total 
school enrollment in a given year.  The number of students per teacher varies meaningfully. 
Teachers who teach small or few classes tend to have more imprecise estimates since their 14 
 
estimates are based on fewer students. In addition to shrinking the estimates, we limit the sample 
to teachers who have at least 10 students in a given year. Shrinking the school fixed effects tends 
not to change the estimates very much given large samples in each school but does change the 
teacher fixed effects measures somewhat. The correlation between our original school by year 
fixed effect estimate and the shrunken estimate is about .99 for both math and reading. The 
correlation between our original teacher by year estimate and the shrunken estimate is .84 for 
math and .81 for reading for the teacher value-added estimates that include a student fixed effect. 
After shrinking the value-added estimates, we standardize them to have a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1 in each year to facilitate interpretation.  
Teacher and school value-added as measured by student achievement gains on state tests 
are clearly not perfect measures of effectiveness.  While measuring effectiveness by how much 
students learn makes sense if we care about student learning, current test scores are a limited 
measure of students’ learning outcomes that we care about.  There also may be bias in attributing 
student test score gains to teachers even though our measures adjust for a rich set of student and 
classroom characteristics.  On the positive side, recent research has demonstrated that higher 
value-added teachers, as measured in ways similar to those employed here, tend to exhibit 
stronger classroom practices as measured by observational protocol such at the Classroom 
Assessment Scoring System (CLASS) (La Paro, Pianta, and Stuhlman 2004) and Protocol for 
Language Arts Teaching Observation (PLATO) (Grossman, Loeb, Cohen, Hammerness, 
Wyckoff, Boyd, and Lankford 2010).  Nonetheless, there is clearly measurement error in our 
estimates of teacher effectiveness and there may be bias as some teachers teach a higher 
proportion of students with negative shocks to their learning in that year and some teachers likely 
teach relatively better in areas not covered as well by the standardized tests.   15 
 
Teacher Recruitment, Assignment, Development and Retention 
We ask four questions in this study. First, to what extent do more effective schools hire 
more effective teachers when vacancies arise? Second, do more effective schools handle teacher 
class assignments more equitably than less effective schools? Third, do teachers improve in 
effectiveness more rapidly when they work in more effective schools? And, finally, to what 
extent do more effective schools retain more effective teachers and remove less effective 
teachers? 
Recruitment and Hiring: Effective schools may hire more effective teachers when 
vacancies arise. In order to examine this issue, we ask whether more effective teachers are more 
likely to transfer to more effective schools. We are unable to examine whether more effective 
schools hire higher-quality new teachers because our measure of effectiveness cannot be 
computed for teachers who have not taught students in a tested subject for at least one year. 
Therefore, this analysis is restricted to teachers who transfer in the following year and for whom 
we have value-added measures in the year before they switch schools.
1 In particular, we ask 
whether the teachers who transfer to more effective schools had higher value-added in prior 
years than teachers who transfer to less effective schools 
The following equations describe the models: 
                                                 ( 2 a )  
                                                           (2b) 
                                                                  ( 2 c )  
                                                                         (2d) 
                                                            
1 Teachers who transfer are systematically different in many ways than those who never transfer during our sample 
period.  They tend to have more experience (8.6 vs. 7.5 years), are less likely to be Hispanic (39 percent vs. 45 
percent), are a bit older (42 vs. 40 years), and are less likely to hold a masters' degree (36 percent vs. 40 percent).  
Teachers who transfer also have lower value-added in math and reading compared to teachers who stay in the same 
school. 16 
 
In the base model, Equation 2a, the effectiveness (TE) in year t of teacher j who started in school 
x in time t and transferred to school s in time t+1 is a function simply of the effectiveness of the 
school he or she transferred to (SE) measured in year t, as well as year and grade indicators.  The 
coefficient on SE measures whether more effective schools differentially attract more effective 
teachers.  We cluster the standard errors by the level of the hiring school, since school value-
added is measured at that level. Since teacher value-added is the outcome variable in these 
analyses, we use the raw (standardized) fixed effects for teachers in this analysis as opposed to 
the shrunk estimates. Using the empirical Bayes shrinkage to account for measurement error in 
the teacher fixed effects is only necessary for unbiased estimates when these measures are used 
on the right-hand side of our equations. 
While Equation 2a answers the research question, we are interested in exploring a 
number of explanations for the observed relationship, 1.  Equations 2b-2d describe this 
exploration.  First we introduce other teacher characteristics (T) including experience, highest 
degree earned, age, race, and gender.  This model (2b) asks whether the relationship between 
teacher and school effectiveness is explained by other observable teacher characteristics that 
these more effective schools might base hiring on.  Next we add in additional controls for the 
characteristics of the hiring school (Ss).  The model (2c) asks whether the relationship between 
teacher and school effectiveness is driven by other characteristics of the hiring school that might 
attract teacher such as size or student characteristics, instead of effectiveness.  The final model 
(2d) adds in controls for the school in which the teacher starts (Sx).  This inclusion helps to 
uncover whether more effective schools are hiring teachers from specific kinds of schools, 
particularly those that produce high value-added transferring teachers.  It may be, for example, 
that the hiring school does not have a good estimate of the value-added of each teacher but 17 
 
judges them based on the school from which they came and, in that way is able to identify more 
effective teachers.   
While models 2b-2c provide suggestive evidence on some of the mechanisms behind the 
univariate relationship between school value-added and the value-added of transfers, we  do not 
have data on applications and offers and, thus, we are not able to discern whether more effective 
schools hire more effective transferring teachers because more effective teachers apply to more 
effective schools or because more effective schools are better able to identify the most effective 
teachers out of their pool of applications.  
Novice Teacher Assignments: Our second research question is whether novice teachers 
receive different types of class assignments when they work in more effective schools. The 
following equation describes the model:  
                                           X                                             (3) 
We predict a class characteristic for teacher i in year t in school s and in grade g,       , as a 
function of whether the teacher is a first or second year teacher (which is our definition of a 
novice teacher); teacher background measures (race, gender, age, and highest degree 
earned),      ,  an interaction between school effectiveness and the novice teacher indicator; and 
a school by year by grade fixed effect,      .  
The estimate    shows the difference in the attributes of the students assigned to novice 
versus more experienced teachers in schools that are of average effectiveness (i.e., where school 
effectiveness is 0). The estimate    shows whether the magnitude of this relationship varies by 
school effectiveness. Our inclusion of the school by year by grade fixed effect means that our 
estimates reflect differences in class assignments for teachers of varying experience or 
demographic characteristics teaching the same grade and in the same school in the same year. 18 
 
The main effect on school value-added is absorbed by the school by year by grade fixed effect. 
Our outcomes include the average prior achievement of teachers’ current students in math and 
reading and the proportion of teachers’ current students scoring in the highest and lowest FCAT 
proficiency levels in the prior year in math and reading. 
Teacher Development: Our third set of models tests whether the value-added of teachers 
changes more across years when they are in an effective school. To examine this we test whether 
teachers’ value-added changes more between years when they are employed at a school that was 
more effective in a prior period. We regress teacher value-added in the current year on teacher 
value-added in the prior year and school value-added measured two years prior. We use a two 
year lag of the school’s value added so that school and teacher effectiveness are not estimated 
from the same test score data. For example, suppose the outcome (teacher value-added) is 
measured in 2008: 2007 and 2008 test data are used to compute teacher value-added in 2008; 
2006 and 2007 data are used to compute prior year’s (2007) teacher value-added; and 2005 and 
2006 data are used to compute school value-added two years ago (2006). Although school value-
added fluctuates over time either due to real changes in school performance or to measurement 
error, the correlation between current and prior year school value-added is between .65 and .80 
as is the correlation between current year and twice lagged school value-added. Since we control 
for the lag of teacher value-added, the coefficients on the other variables in the model indicate 
change in their value-added as a function of a covariate. All specifications control for school 
year, grade taught, and teacher experience which is entered as dummy variables. We control for 
grade taught since students may exhibit lower learning gains in some grades than in others and 
control for teacher experience since prior studies suggest that the rate at which teachers improve 
tends to flatten after their first few years of teaching.  19 
 
The model is shown by the following equation which predicts the effectiveness of a 
teacher as a function of the school’s prior effectiveness: 
                                                                                  (4) 
where        is teacher effectiveness in subject m in the current year,          is teacher 
effectiveness in the prior year,          is school effectiveness two years ago,      are dummy 
variables for teacher experience and     and    are year and grade fixed effects. We estimate this 
model for all teachers regardless of whether they changed schools since the year prior but also 
compare these estimates to those from a model restricted to teachers who remain in the same 
school and find similar results.  
One worry with the model described in equation 4 is that measurement error in prior year 
teacher effectiveness biases the estimation. Shrinking the estimates accounts for sampling error 
but there could be other types of error in this particular analysis that we may need to worry about 
– error that comes from factors that produce variation in teacher effectiveness from year to year 
such as a barking dog when students are taking the test.  In particular, consider two teachers with 
equal value-added in a given year.  The teacher in the better school may normally be a better 
teacher and thus has a tendency to revert back to his or her higher average, while a teacher in a 
less effective year may normally be a worse teacher and similarly reverts back to his or her lower 
average value-added.  This would be a classic case of mean reversion and would upwardly bias 
our estimate of the relationship between school effectiveness and growth in teacher 
effectiveness.  To adjust for this error, we instrument for prior year value-added in a given 
subject using prior year value-added in the other subject. That is, in analyses that examine 
changes to math value-added, we instrument for prior math value-added using prior reading 20 
 
value-added and vice versa. These analyses are necessarily restricted to elementary school 
teachers who have classes with students tested in both subjects.    
  Retention:  Fourth and finally, we examine the association between teacher turnover, 
teacher effectiveness, and school effectiveness using logit models to predict whether a teacher 
leaves his or her school at the end of a year as a function of school value-added, teacher value-
added and the interaction between the two.  Here we are asking whether more effective teachers 
are differentially more likely to leave (or stay at) more effective schools.  Equation 5 describes 
the model: 
  Pr        1    
  
              
                                                                                      (5) 
  
The outcome Y is the probability that teacher j in school s in time t will not return to their 
school in time t+1 and is estimated as a function of the teacher's own characteristics not 
including effectiveness (T), his or her effectiveness (TE), the school's characteristics (S), the 
school’s effectiveness (SE), and the interaction between the school’s and the teacher's 
effectiveness.  The model also includes school fixed effects so that comparisons of turnover rates 
are made among teachers who vary in effectiveness at the same school. The coefficient on the 
interaction in this model, 5, tells us whether there are differential career paths for teachers of 
varying effectiveness as a function of the school’s effectiveness. We cluster the standard errors 
in these models at the school level since the observations are not independent.  
In addition to using continuous measures of school and teacher value-added, we also 
estimate models that use quartiles of these measures. Prior research suggests that principals have 
difficulty distinguishing among teachers at their school who are in the middle of the quality 21 
 
distribution but that they are able to distinguish between those at the top and bottom in terms of 
effectiveness (Jacob and Lefgren 2008). If principals are to target their retention efforts on 
particular teachers, then they must be able to distinguish among the best and worst teachers at 
their school. We therefore generate quartiles of teacher value-added (within each school) and 
include dummy variables flagging teachers in the top and bottom quartiles. For this analysis we 
also use a measure that distinguishes schools that are in the top quartile of school value-added 
(generated within each year and school-level) instead of using the continuous measure.  
Since teacher and school value-added are each measured separately in each year, these 
estimates tell us whether schools that were more effective in one year are better able to keep their 
more effective teachers and remove their less effective teachers the following year. Our use of 
measures of value-added that vary by year is important for our estimation strategy. Though 
pooling value-added measures across years may be preferable given small samples for some 
teachers and measurement error in tests (McCaffrey, Sass, Lockwood, and Mihaly 2009), in our 
case this makes the causal ordering of these measures ambiguous. In the teacher turnover 
analyses, for example, we want to test whether more effective schools are able to keep good 
teachers and remove ineffective ones. We also want to be able to rule out an alternative 
explanation (of a reversal in causal ordering) that schools look like they have higher value-added 
only because they happened to have particularly good teachers.  For example, if we estimated 
school value-added in the year after less-effective teachers left and more effective teachers 
stayed, the school would look more effective regardless of its practices in the prior years that led 
to this differential turnover.  While the year-by-year measures of school and teacher 
effectiveness are less precise than measures averaged over all years, the value-added based on 22 
 
prior years allows us to examine how school effectiveness in a given period influences teacher 
turnover behavior in a subsequent period and helps us avoid the problems described above.
 2  
 
RESULTS    
Recruitment and Hiring:  More effective schools may hire higher value-added teachers 
when vacancies arise. This differential hiring may be driven by pro-active recruitment efforts by 
such schools, better ability to distinguish among job candidates, or by teachers' preferences for 
more effective schools.  While we can't separate the possible mechanisms, Table 2 shows 
evidence of differential hiring.  In these models we take all teachers who transfer and regress the 
value-added of the teacher who transfers (measured in the year prior to their transfer) on the 
effectiveness of the school to which they transfer (measured in the year prior to the teacher’s 
transfer).  We estimate each of these models for the version of teacher value-added that include 
and exclude student fixed effects. We do not show estimates using the version of teacher value-
added that includes school fixed effects because we are not interested in comparing teachers in 
the same school for these analyses.  
The coefficients on the interactions between teacher and school value-added are positive 
across all specifications suggesting that higher value-added teachers tend to transfer to more 
effective schools. Model 1 is the simple bivariate association between teacher and school value-
added.  Here we find a positive association between transferring teachers’ value-added and the 
value-added of the school to which they transfer. For example, the top panel for math value-
                                                            
2 There is some concern in the value-added literature about issues with non-persistent teacher effects (McCaffrey, 
Sass, Lockwood, and Mihaly 2009). McCaffrey et al. (2009), for example, find that between 30-60 percent of the 
variation in measured teacher effectiveness is due to “noise” in student test scores rather than to real differences 
between teachers. The proposed solution is to either average teacher effects over multiple years or to take teacher by 
year fixed effects and estimate the true signal variance by the covariance of these effects across years. However, this 
method will not work in our case. For the analyses described below we require measures of value-added for teachers 
and schools that are estimated separately in each year to avoid problems such as circularity and reverse causation.  
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added shows that a one standard deviation increase in the value-added of hiring schools is 
associated with a 0.15 standard deviation in the value-added of the transferring teacher. The 
relationship is 0.10 for reading value-added.  
These relationships remain positive in model 2 when we add controls for other teacher 
characteristics. The magnitude of the estimates is reduced somewhat, however, suggesting that 
teacher effectiveness may be associated with other teacher characteristics that more effective 
schools look for when hiring (e.g., teacher experience). Adding additional controls for 
characteristics of schools to which teachers transfer in model 3 does little to change the 
estimates. This suggests that observable school characteristics that might influence teachers’ 
transfer decisions bear little association with school value-added. This result is expected given 
that school effectiveness is estimated via value-added where other school characteristics are 
controlled. The magnitude of the coefficients is reduced somewhat when controlling for the 
characteristics of teachers’ initial schools in model 4. This reduction may suggest that school 
hiring authorities consider the characteristics of a teacher’s prior school when hiring.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that more effective teachers tend to move to more 
effective schools, though we cannot discern whether this results from differential personnel 
practices or from teachers’ preferences for more effective schools.  
Novice Teacher Assignments: Table 3 describes variation in novice teachers’ class  
assignments by school effectiveness. We show the results using both current school value-added 
to predict class assignments and prior year school value-added, in case current effectiveness is 
influenced by the distribution of teachers to students. The results are largely the same in direction 
and magnitude.  24 
 
The table shows consistent evidence that novice teachers are assigned lower achieving 
students than their colleagues across all types of schools. However, the magnitudes of these 
relationships are weaker in more effective schools. For example, the main effect on novice 
teacher in the first column under the first panel shows that novice teachers are assigned students 
whose average prior achievement in math is .05 standard deviations lower than the average prior 
achievement of their more experienced colleagues at their school (in schools at the mean of 
effectiveness). The interaction between novice teacher and school value-added in this model is a 
positive .02 suggesting that the effect is only about half as large in schools that are one standard 
deviation above the mean of school value-added. The results are similar for the average prior 
reading achievement of teachers’ students as well as for the percentage of teachers’ students who 
scored at the highest and lowest proficiency level on the FCAT in the prior year.
3 These results 
provide clear and consistent evidence that more equitable assignments for novice teachers 
distinguishes effective schools from less effective schools.  
Teacher Development:  Next, we investigate whether teachers improve their ability to 
raise student achievement more rapidly when working in effective schools. Table 4 provides the 
results of these models. In Table 4 we examine the relationship between the change in teacher 
value-added between the current and prior year and the school’s effectiveness two years ago. The 
reason we measure school value-added two years ago is that we worry that if we used concurrent 
value-added the effects might be circular since the teacher’s value-added in the prior year is also 
in the model and the teacher and school measures were estimated on the same data. We use 
measures of teacher value-added that are estimated with and without student fixed effects. We 
                                                            
3 One factor that could influence the extent to which schools assign novice teachers to lower achieving students is 
the standard deviation of achievement within schools. We found only a very weak relationship between school 
value-added and the standard deviation of math achievement. The correlations are -.04 in elementary schools and     
-.10 in high schools.  25 
 
exclude the version of teacher value-added estimated using school fixed effects because in these 
analyses we are not interested in comparing teachers within the same school but, rather, teachers 
who teach in different schools (i.e., more and less effective schools).  We present both OLS 
estimates (in the first four columns of Table 4) and the IV estimates (in the final four columns of 
Table 4).  
Both the OLS and IV estimates show a fairly consistent relationship between school 
effectiveness and teacher improvement in math value-added. The estimates are positive and 
significant for reading value-added when we use the version of teacher value-added that includes 
student fixed effects but are about 0 and not significant in the version of teacher value-added that 
excludes student fixed effects. When we look at the IV estimates for the version of teacher value-
added estimated with student fixed effects (bottom panel of Table 4), we find that a one standard 
deviation increase school value-added (measured 2 years ago) is associated with a .10-.12 greater 
increase in teacher value-added over a one year period. These results are consistent when we 
restrict the models to teachers who taught at the same school in the years in which we measure 
change in their value-added. 
Retention: Finally, we examine whether more effective schools are better able to retain 
their best teachers and remove their least effective teachers. In Table 5 we show results from 
logistic regression models that predict whether a teacher leaves their school at the end of the year 
as a function of their own value-added, their school value-added, and the interaction between the 
two. The table reports odds ratios and t-statistics. All models include controls for teacher and 
school characteristics and school fixed effects. We control for teacher and school characteristics 
to adjust for factors that might be associated with teacher turnover and teacher effectiveness. We 
include the school fixed effect so our comparisons are made only among teachers who vary in 26 
 
effectiveness within schools.  Both school and teacher value-added have been standardized to 
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 within each school year. We restrict these 
analyses to teachers who have been employed in the district for five years or fewer. Rates of 
transfer and attrition from the district are more than twice as large for less experienced teachers 
relative to older and more experienced teachers. The latter set of teachers is much less likely to 
leave their school or the district.
4 In addition to using continuous measures of value-added, we 
also break these measures into quartiles and examine the retention of low (bottom quartile) and 
high (top quartile) teachers in the most effective schools (top quartile). As with the previous 
analyses, we show these results using three different measures of teacher value-added.  
The models that use the continuous measures of math value-added suggest that teachers 
who are more effective at raising math achievement are less likely to leave their school, which is 
consistent with prior research (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2008; Goldhaber, 
Gross, and Player 2007; Hanushek, Kain, O'Brien, and Rivkin 2005). For example, the main 
effect on teacher value-added in the first column suggests that a one standard deviation in teacher 
math value-added is associated with a 20 percent decline in the odds of leaving one’s current 
school (in schools that are of average effectiveness).  
The table also shows that the likelihood that more effective teachers leave their school is 
even lower when they work in more effective schools—i.e., the school-by-teacher value-added 
interactions are all negative and statistically significant for math. The interactions are also 
negative for reading value-added but are not statistically significant. These findings hold across 
all three methods of computing teacher value-added. The results are similar when we break 
teacher value-added up into quartiles. Here we find that the most effective schools (top quartile) 
                                                            
4 The findings discussed here are similar in direction when all teachers are included (i.e., experienced and novice) 
but smaller in magnitude and generally not statistically significant. 27 
 
are better able to keep their best (top quartile) teachers. They are not, however, differentially able 
to remove their least effective (bottom quartile) teachers. These results hold across all versions of 




Not surprisingly, teachers in more effective schools demonstrate more positive career 
trajectories.  The results presented above have shown that more effective schools are able to 
attract more effective teachers when teachers transfer across schools.  In fact, a school that is one 
standard deviation above the mean of effectiveness attracts teachers who are 10 to 15 percent of 
a standard deviation more effective.  These schools also assign teachers to students more 
equitably.  While novice teachers systematically teach students with lower entering test scores 
than their more senior colleagues, these relationships are approximately half as large in schools 
that are one standard deviation more effective.  Teachers in more effective schools also improve 
more rapidly from year to year.  On average, in schools that are one standard deviation more 
effective, teachers’ value-added increases by up to 10 percent of a standard deviation more in a 
given year, though these results vary by specification. Finally these schools differentially retain 
more effective teachers.  The probably that a teacher who is in the top quartile of effectiveness 
will leave in a given year is 30 to 40 percent lower in top quartile school.  We do not find 
differential attrition of less effective teachers relative to teachers demonstrating average value-
added in more effective schools. 
Two caveats are warranted in interpreting these results.  First, the results we found, while 
in the same direction when effectiveness is defined in terms of value added to students’ reading 28 
 
achievement as they are when value-added is defined by math achievement, the results for 
reading are not as consistently statistically different from zero.  This is not the first study to find 
clearer effects for mathematics than for English language arts, however, the difference is still 
worth noting. 
The second caveat is that we have not attempted to identify the cause of the patterns we 
observe.  While the more equitable assignment of teachers to classrooms is likely to be the result 
of school practices, we do not know whether these practices are driven by teachers or by the 
school leadership.  The differential hiring of more effective transferring teachers might not even 
be driven by school practices.  Teachers may be attracted to these schools because they are more 
effective.  Similarly, less effective teachers may choose to leave these more effective schools not 
because they are encouraged to leave but because they feel out of place. 
Nonetheless, while we cannot definitely attribute the patterns of recruitment, assignment, 
development and retention to school leadership, the results suggest that school leadership and 
particular school personnel practices may be a driving force in effective schooling.  Not only are 
school leaders responsible for personnel practices, but recent prior work has highlighted the 
importance of personnel practices and other organizational management practices for 
distinguishing (if not causing) effective schools (Grissom and Loeb 2009; Horng, Klasik, and 
Loeb 2010). The results are also not surprising.  Teachers strongly affect students’ educational 
opportunities.  Higher performing schools seem better able to build a staff of strong teachers 
through differential retention of good teachers, through recruitment and hiring, and through 
providing supports for teacher improvement.  This paper provides some empirical evidence that 
more effective schools are doing all three.  In addition, these schools appear to use their teaching 
resources more efficiently, not assigning new teachers to lower performing students. 29 
 
Appendix 1:  Bayesian Shrinkage 
 
Our estimated teacher effect (   
 ) is the sum of a “true” teacher effect    ) plus some 
measurement error
5:  
   
            .         ( 1 )  
The empirical Bayes estimate of a teacher’s effect is a weighted average of their estimated fixed 
effect and the average fixed effect in the population where the weight, λj, is a function of the 
precision of each teacher’s fixed effect and therefore varies by j and t. The less precise the 
estimate, the more we weight the mean. The more precise the estimate, the more we weight the 
estimate and the less we weight the mean. Similarly, the more variable the true score (holding the 
precision of the estimate constant) the less we weight the mean, and the less variable the true 
score, the more we weight the mean assuming the true score is probably close to the mean.  The 
weight, λj, should give the proportion of the variance in what we observe that is due to the 
variance in the true score relative to the variance due to both the variance in the true score and 
precision of the estimate. This more efficient estimator of teacher quality is generated by:  
           
     1                      
     ( 2 )  
where      
     
                   ( 3 )  
Thus, the term j can be interpreted as the proportion of total variation in the teacher effects that 
is attributable to true differences between teachers. The terms in (3) are unknown so are 
estimated with sample analogs.  
                      
           ( 4 )  
 
                                                            
5 Here we make the classical errors in variables (CEV) assumption, assuming that measurement error is not 
associated with an unobserved explanatory variable.  30 
 
which is the square of the standard error of the teacher fixed effects. The variance of the true 
fixed effect is determined by: 
                                         ( 5 )  
where        is the variance of the estimated teacher fixed effects (Gordon, Kane, and Staiger 







Aaronson, Daniel, Lisa Barrow, and William Sander. 2007. "Teachers and Student Achievement 
in Chicago Public High Schools." Journal of Labor Economics 25:95-135. 
Balu, Rekha, Tara Beteille, and Susanna Loeb. 2010. "Examining Teacher Turnover: The Role 
of School Leadership." Politique Americaine 15:55-79. 
Boyd, Donald, Pam Grossman, Hamilton Lankford, Susanna Loeb, and James Wyckoff. 2008. 
"Who Leaves? Teacher Attrition and Student Achievement." National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper 14022: http://www.nber.org/papers/w14022.pdf, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Boyd, Donald, Hamilton Lankford, Susanna Loeb, Matthew Ronfeldt, and James Wyckoff. 2011. 
"The Role of Teacher Quality in Retention and Hiring: Using Applications-to-Transfer to 
Uncover Preferences of Teachers and Schools." Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 30:88-110. 
Boyd, Donald, Hamilton Lankford, Susanna Loeb, Matthew Ronfeldt, and James Wyckoff. 
forthcoming. "The Role of Teacher Quality in Retention and Hiring: Using Applications-
to-Transfer to Uncover Preferences of Teachers and Schools." Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Management. 
Boyd, Donald, Hamilton Lankford, Susanna Loeb, and James Wyckoff. 2005. "The Draw of 
Home: How Teachers' Preferences for Proximity Disadvantage Urban Schools." Journal 
of Policy Analysis and Management 24:113-132. 
Clotfelter, Charles T., Helen Ladd, and Jacob L. Vigdor. 2006. "Teacher-Student Matching and 
the Assessment of Teacher Effectiveness." Journal of Human Resources 41:778-820. 
Coleman, James S. 1990. "Equality of Educational Opportunity." in Equality and Achievement in 
Education, edited by J. S. Coleman. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Downey, Douglas B., Paul T. von Hippel, and Beckett A. Broh. 2004. "Are Schools the Great 
Equalizer? Cognitive Inequality During the Summer Months and the School Year." 
American Sociological Review 69:613-635. 
Feng, Li. 2010. "Hire Today, Gone Tomorrow: New Teacher Classroom Assignments and 
Teacher Mobility." Education Finance and Policy 5:278-316. 
Ferguson, Ronald. 1998. "Can Schools Narrow the Black-White Test Score Gap?" Pp. 318-374 
in The Black-White Test Score Gap, edited by C. Jencks and M. Phillips. Washington, 
DC: Brookings. 
Goldhaber, Dan, Betheny Gross, and Daniel Player. 2007. "Are Public Schools Really Losing 
Their Best? Assessing the Career Transitions of Teachers and Their Implications for the 
Quality of the Teacher Workforce." National Center for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in 
Education Research (CALDER): 
http://www.caldercenter.org/PDF/1001115_Public_Schools.pdf. 
Gordon, Robert, Thomas J. Kane, and Douglas O. Staiger. 2006. "Identifying Effective Teachers 
Using Performance on the Job." 
Grissom, Jason  and Susanna Loeb. 2009. "Triangulating Principal Effectiveness:  How 
Perspectives of Parents, Teachers, and Assistant Principals Identify the Central 
Importance of Managerial Skills." National Center for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in 
Education Research (CALDER) Working Paper 35. 
Grossman, Pamela, Susanna Loeb, Julia Cohen, Karen Hammerness, James Wyckoff, Donald 
Boyd, and Hamilton Lankford. 2010. "Measure for Measure: The Relationship betweeen 32 
 
Measures of Instructional Practice in Middle School English Language Arts and 
Teachers' Value-Added Scores." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
#16015, Cambridge, MA. 
Hanushek, Eric A., John F. Kain, Daniel M. O'Brien, and Steven G. Rivkin. 2005. "The Market 
for Teacher Quality." National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 11154, 
Cambridge. 
Hanushek, Eric, John F. Kain, and Steven G. Rivkin. 2004. "Why Public Schools Lose 
Teachers." Journal of Human Resources 39:326-354. 
Horng, Eileen, Daniel Klasik, and Susanna Loeb. 2010. "Principal's Time Use and School 
Effectiveness." American Journal of Education 116:491-523. 
Jacob, Brian A and Lars Lefgren. 2005. "Principals As agents: Subjective performance 
measurement in education." in NBER Working Paper Series. Cambridge: NBER. 
Jacob, Brian A. and Lars Lefgren. 2008. "Can Principals Identify Effective Teachers? Evidence 
on Subjective Performance Evaluation in Education." Journal of Labor Economics 
26:101-136. 
Kalogrides, Demetra, Susanna Loeb, and Tara Béteille. 2011. "Power Play? Teacher 
Characteristics and Class Assignments." in Annual Meetings of the Association for 
Education Finance and Policy. Seattle, WA. 
Kane, Thomas J., Jonah E. Rockoff, and Douglas O. Staiger. 2008. "What Does Certification 
Tell Us About Teacher Effectiveness? Evidence from New York City." Economics of 
Education Review 27:615-631. 
Krei, Melinda. 1998. "Intensifying the Barriers: The Problem of Inequitable Teacher Allocation 
in Low-Income Urban Schools." Urban Education 33:71-94. 
La Paro, Karen M., Robert C. Pianta, and Megan Stuhlman. 2004. "Classroom Assessment 
Scoring System (CLASS): Findings from the Pre-K Year." Elementary School Journal 
104:409-426. 
Lankford, Hamilton, Susanna Loeb, and James Wyckoff. 2002. "Teacher Sorting and the Plight 
of Urban Schools: A Descriptive Analysis." Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 
24:37-62. 
McCaffrey, Daniel F., Tim R. Sass, J.R. Lockwood, and Kata Mihaly. 2009. "The Intertemporal 
Variability of Teacher Effect Estimates." Education Finance and Policy 4:572-606. 
Meyer, Robert H. 1997. "Value-Added Indicators of School Performance: A Primer." Economics 
of Education Review 16:283-301. 
Nye, Barbara, Spyros Konstantopoulos, and Larry V. Hedges. 2004. "How Large Are Teacher 
Effects?" Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 26:237-257. 
Rivkin, Steven G., Erik A. Hanushek, and John F. Kain. 2005. "Teachers, Schools, and 
Academic Achievement." Econometrica 73:417-458. 
Rockoff, Jonah. 2004. "The impact of individual teachers on student achievement: Evidence 
from panel data." American Economic Review 94:247-252. 
Rothstein, Jesse. 2009. "Student Sorting and Bias in Value-Added Estimation: Selection on 
Observables and Unobservables." Education Finance and Policy 4:537-571. 
Rubin, Donald, Elizabeth A Stuart, and Elaine L. Zanutto. 2004. "A Potential Outcomes View of 
Value-Added Assessment in Education." Journal of Educational and Behavioral 
Statistics 29:103-116. 
Sammons, Pam, Josh Hillman, and Peter Mortimore. 1995. "Key Characteristics of Effective 
Schools: A Review of School Effectiveness Research." International School 33 
 
Effectiveness and Improvement Center. Institute of Education, University of London., 
London. 
Sanders, William and June Rivers. 1996. "Cumulative and Residual Effects of Teachers on 
Future Student Academic Achievement." Knoxville: University of Tennessee Value-
Added Research and Assessment Center. 
Scafidi, Benjamin, David L. Sjoquist, and Todd R. Stinebrickner. 2008. "Race, Poverty, and 
Teacher Mobility." Economics of Education Review 26:145-159. 
Willms, J Douglas and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 1989. "A Longitudinal Hierarchical Linear 











Average Standardized Test Score Gain in Math 0.01 0.65
Average Standardized Test Score Gain in Reading 0.02 0.67
Standardized Math Score ‐0.01 1.00




Limited English Proficient 0.09
Retained in Year Prior 0.07
Eligible for Subsidized Lunch 0.61
Total Student Observations (with test scores) 880946
Unique Students (with test scores) 351888
Average Number of Observations Per Student 3
Teacher Characteristics
1 





Master's Degree or Higher 0.36
Number of Teacher Observations 29251
Number of Teachers  10326
School Characteristics (in 2008)
% Eligible for Subsidized Lunch 0.67 0.23
% Minority (Black or Hispanic) 0.89 0.12
% Achievement Low Achieving in Math 0.18 0.15
% Achievement Low Achieving in Reading 0.24 0.17




Number of Schools 422










School Value‐Added   0.150 *     0.126 +     0.115 +      0.056
(0.070)    (0.064)    (0.067)      (0.055)
N           3620       3620       3620         3617
Teacher Value­Added in Reading
School Value‐Added   0.101 *     0.084      0.098 +      0.097 +  
(0.050)    (0.054)    (0.054)      (0.054)   
N           3766       3766       3766         3763
TVA Estimated with Student Fixed Effects and (time­varying) Student, School, and Class Controls
Teacher Value­Added in Math
School Value‐Added   0.125 *     0.151 **    0.124 *      0.076 *  
(0.061)    (0.051)    (0.050)      (0.038)   
N           3617       3617       3617         3615
Teacher Value­Added in Reading
School Value‐Added   0.118 *     0.110 +     0.107 +      0.064
(0.058)    (0.058)    (0.057)      (0.052)
N           3766       3766       3766         3763
Teacher Controls ‐‐ X X X
New School Controls ‐‐ ‐‐ X X
Current School Controls ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ X
Clustered Standard Errors (by hiring school) X X X X
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 The version of school value‐added used includes student fixed effects and 





Novice Teacher  ‐0.050 ***  ‐0.045 ***
         (0.007)    (0.009)    
Novice Teacher*School Value‐Added   0.020 *     0.029 ** 
         (0.008)    (0.009)    
N          56204      41640    
Prior Reading Achievement of Teachers' Current Students
Novice Teacher  ‐0.049 ***  ‐0.044 ***
         (0.008)    (0.009)    
Novice Teacher*School Value‐Added   0.022 **    0.031 ***
         (0.008)    (0.009)    
N          56226   41656
Percentage of Low Achieving Students in Math
Novice Teacher   0.014 ***   0.012 ***
         (0.003)    (0.003)    
Novice Teacher*School Value‐Added  ‐0.007 **   ‐0.010 ** 
         (0.003)    (0.003)    
N          56293   41711
Percentage of High Achieving Students in Math
Novice Teacher  ‐0.010 ***  ‐0.011 ***
         (0.001)    (0.001)    
Novice Teacher*School Value‐Added   0.002 *     0.003 *  
         (0.001)    (0.001)    
N          56293   41711
Percentage of Low Achieving Students in Reading
Novice Teacher   0.014 ***   0.010 ** 
         (0.003)    (0.004)    
Novice Teacher*School Value‐Added  ‐0.009 **   ‐0.013 ***
         (0.003)    (0.004)    
N          56318   41732
Percentage of High Achieving Students in Reading
Novice Teacher  ‐0.007 ***  ‐0.007 ***
         (0.001)    (0.001)    
Novice Teacher*School Value‐Added   0.003 **    0.003 ** 
         (0.001)    (0.001)    
N          56318   41732
School by Year by Grade Fixed Effect XX








Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 The version of school value‐added used includes student fixed 
effects and (time‐varying) student, school, and class controls. Novice teachers are those in their 




        
1 212 1212
TVA Estimated with Student, School, and Class Controls
Teacher Value‐Added in Prior Year    0.554 ***   0.532 ***   0.537 ***   0.518 ***    0.697 ***   0.690 ***   0.663 ***   0.658 ***
          (0.018)    (0.019)    (0.020)    (0.021)     (0.033)    (0.034)    (0.036)    (0.036)   
School Value‐Added 2 Years Ago    0.049 *     0.054 **    0.013     ‐0.000       0.046 *     0.051 *     0.005     ‐0.004   
 (0.020)    (0.020)    (0.023)    (0.023)     (0.020)    (0.020)    (0.023)    (0.024)   
TVA Estimated with Student Fixed Effects and (time­varying) Student, School, and Class Controls
Teacher Value‐Added in Prior Year    0.486 ***   0.454 ***   0.451 ***   0.409 ***    0.416 ***   0.407 ***   0.346 ***   0.330 ***
          (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.025)    (0.025)     (0.079)    (0.075)    (0.082)    (0.080)   
School Value‐Added 2 Years Ago    0.091 ***   0.112 ***   0.092 ***   0.090 ***    0.101 ***   0.120 ***   0.106 ***   0.099 ***
 (0.027)    (0.027)    (0.026)    (0.026)     (0.029)    (0.030)    (0.028)    (0.027)   
N (Observations)     1759       1759       1842       1842        1759       1759       1842       1842
Teacher‐Level Controls ‐‐‐ X ‐‐‐ X ‐‐‐ X ‐‐‐ X
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 The version of school value‐added used includes student fixed effects and (time‐varying) student, school, and class controls. In 
the IV models, we instrument for prior teacher value‐added in a given subject with their value‐added in the opposite subject. 
OLS IV







Teacher Value Added   0.811 ***   0.832 ***   0.786 ***
(‐6.508)    (‐6.437)    (‐6.657)    
School*Teacher Value Added   0.925 *     0.940 *     0.934 *  
(‐2.378)    (‐2.004)    (‐2.077)    
Math Value Added, Quartile Measures                                   
Teacher Value‐Added: Bottom Quartile   1.342 ***   1.378 ***   1.267 ***
         (4.220)    (4.558)    (3.385)    
Teacher Value‐Added: Top Quartile   1.004      1.043      0.952    
         (0.052)    (0.505)    (‐0.585)    
School Value‐Added: Top Quartile   1.177 +     1.113      1.114    
(1.682)    (1.094)    (1.100)    
TVA Bottom Quartile*SVA Top Quartile   0.907      0.979      1.053    
(‐0.702)    (‐0.151)    (0.349)    
TVA Top Quartile* SVA Top Quartile   0.579 ***   0.659 **    0.734 *  
         (‐3.515)    (‐2.705)    (‐2.116)    
Teacher and School Controls X X X
School Fixed Effect X X X
N          10333      10333      10325
Reading Value Added, Continuous Measures
Teacher Value Added   0.914 **    0.909 **    0.934 *  
(‐3.226)    (‐3.260)    (‐2.063)    
School*Teacher Value Added   0.981      0.970      0.982    
(‐0.687)    (‐1.038)    (‐0.623)    
Reading Value Added, Quartile Measures                                   
Teacher Value‐Added: Bottom Quartile   1.008      1.056      0.996    
         (0.116)    (0.793)    (‐0.053)    
Teacher Value‐Added: Top Quartile   0.839 *     0.848 *     0.922    
         (‐2.246)    (‐2.129)    (‐1.051)    
School Value‐Added: Top Quartile   1.093      1.114      1.084    
(0.927)    (1.124)    (0.832)    
TVA Bottom Quartile*SVA Top Quartile   1.001      0.991      1.031    
(0.004)    (‐0.066)    (0.207)    
TVA Top Quartile* SVA Top Quartile   0.812      0.756 +     0.832    
         (‐1.390)    (‐1.837)    (‐1.290)    
Teacher and School Controls X X X
School Fixed Effect X X X
N          11293      11293      11293
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 Models 1, 2, and 3 differ in terms of the measure of teacher 
value‐added used. Model 1 uses a version of teacher value‐added estimated with student, class, 
and school‐level controls. Model 2 uses a version of teacher value‐added estimated with a 
school fixed effect and student, class and (time‐varying) school‐level controls. Model 3 uses a 
version of teacher value‐added estimated with a student fixed effect and (time‐varying) 
student, class, and school‐level controls. The version of school‐value added used is analagous 
to the version of teacher value‐added used in model 3.